We sho", [ha[ liquidity providers do 1I0[ sigllifiealllly respond [O ehanges ill illfomw[ion asymmeu) ' risks, al leasl ",hell "'e J EL c1assifieation: G 14.
lntroduelion
Trading meehanisms for equilies presenl allernative eharaeteristies around lhe world. In general, lrading systems can be c1assified inlo batch markets and eontinuous markels. In lhis papel', we are eoncerncd with a continuous market where a lransaetion takes place whenever I\VO orders are matehed. 11 is well kno\Vn lhat this mechanism provides continuous priee informalion throughoul lhe period in whieh lhe markel is open. Moreover, eonlinuous markels are eilher dealer markels 01' auclion markels. Of course, in a dealer markel, lhe trading meehanism is driven by priees \Vith exchange-designaled pecialists providing liquidity lO lhe markel. Ask and bid priees and lhe number of shares available at eaeh quote are offered simultaneously by markel makers. It is also lhe case lhal pecialisls are obliged lo maintain a limil order book eontaining lhe publie's limil orders. On lhe olher hand, in lhe auelion syslem, public lrading orders are direclly malehed against one anolher. These are markets driven by orders. In 1989, the Spanish Stock Exehange became a continuous auetion system by adopling lhe Compuler assisled lrading syslCm (CATS).' The public·s limil orders are displayed in a compuler file. In this way, execulion against limit orders left on lhe compulerised book is aJ10wed by lhe Irading mechanism. By moniloring availabJc bids and offers on Ihe book, slock exchange agcncies (brokers) can exccute upcoming orders against an exisling bid or offer. Allernalively, lhey can inlroduce a new sale or purchase order. Thus, public limil ordcrs represcnl lhe available bids and offers. In lhis sense, lhe analogue of the bid-ask spread on lhe cOlllinuous auction syslem is the spread belween lhe beSl buy and seJ1 limit orders oUlstanding al any given lime. Evcn without a market maker who cominuously establishes quolcs, il is lhe casc lhat whcn an invcstor tries lO sell any amoulll of slock, he or shc gels a lower pricc lhan lhc price lhal has to bc paid for il. In a conlinuous auclion markel, agenls or speculators lrying lO absorb tcmporary imbalances of supply and demand lO make a profil wiJ1 require a premium from buyers and impose an additional compensalion on seJ1ers.
Il is imporlanl \O realisc thal in setting lhe implicit bid-ask spread, we run in\O lhc same reasons Ihal ineluce markel makers lO be compensaleel. In particular, lhey necel to be remuncrateel for laking risky posilions, for lhc risk of lrading wilh an insider. and for lhe expenscs necessary lO maintain lheir presence in lhe markel. In a mcchanism driven by prices, elealers sel Ihe spread lO protect lhemselves from lrading with better informed indivieluals. Dealers expect to lose on average lo better informed lraders and gain on avcrage from lransaclions wilh uninformed lraders. The ame rcasoning applies lO cominuous auclion markets lhroughoul lhe establishmenl of public limil orders.
The objeclive o[ this paper is lO sludy lhe imporlance of Ihe asymmclric informalion componem of lhe implicit bid-ask spread in a cominuous auction markel. If, givcn asymmelric informal ion among Iraders, lhc adverse selection component is present, lhc implicil spread should be higher (Iowcr) whenever lhe probability of informal ion diffcrelllial among traelers has augmcmed (diminishcd) . Surprisingly, cmpirical aelverse seteclion lileralure is cxcIusively coneenlraled on traeling mechanisms where thc markel maker plays an explicil role. Recenlly, Lehmann and Modest (1994) carefuJ1y describe lhc lrading and liquidity characleristics of thc Tokyo Stock Exehange. However, lhey do not analyse lhe pOlemial aelverse seleclion componem wilhin lhe diffcrence between lhe besl buy and seJ1 limit orelers outslanding.
In order lO sludy lhe importance of adverse seieelion on the implicil bid-ask spread. wc analyse Ihc effecls of informalion announccmcllls on lhc sprcad. Given thal signaJ1ing theories suggcst Ihal dividends convey information <lbOUl managers' expeclalions reg<lrding lhe fUlUre cash nows of lhe finn. lhe spre<ld shoulel be expected \O ch<lnge during perioels of elivielend announcemems. Moreover, Ihe an<llysis c<ln be easily exlended \O Ihe study of markel liquielity by considering lhe effeets on eleplhs. 11 shoulel be recaJ1ed lhal liquidily effeC1S are unambiguous only when wc observe a spread increasc (decrease) <lnd <1 simullaneous deplh decrcase (increase).'
When \Ve conduct univariate tests 011 lhe imp,lct of lhe arrival of new information regarding dividends on spread and deplh. Out empiric<ll evidenee seems lO support importa nI adverse seleclion effccls on sprcad. However. lhere exisls a significanl invcrse relation betwecn either volumc or lhe Ilumber of transactions and spread. Moreover, lhis invcrsc relalion is shown to be elominaled by lhe number of transactions. This is an interesting result. It should be noled thal lenes el al. (1994) argue lhal il is Ihe occurrence of lransaclions, and nol Iheir size, thal is behind volatility. Our results lend LO suppon lhis cvidence evcn in continuous auclion markets. In facl, when we relale volalility to average lrade size and lO Ihe number of transaclions. lhe resulls suggesl ralher unambiguously thal lhere exists only a posilive relalion belween volalilily and the number of lransaclions.
Once lhis inverse relalion is incorporaled into lhe analysis of lhe cffecls of dividend announcemenls on lhe spread, we are nol able lO find any compensalion for adver e seleclion in the reaction of spread. This reSUll remains lhe same whelher we observe increased, mail1lained or decreased dividends over lhe previous paymenl. Thus, we may argue lhal inve lors are nol significantly compensaled for adverse seleclion. al leasl when we infer our conclusions on Ihe basis of limil orders dala around dividend announcemenls. Liquidity providers in conlinuous auction trading mechanisms do nol seem lO be sensilive lO changes in informalion asymmelry risks.
The paper is organised as follows. Seclion 2 describes our data. In Seclion 3, we presel1l an analysis of the seasonal characlerislics of trading and liquidity on lhe continuous Spanish Stock Exchange markel. Univariale lesls regarding dividend allnouncemellts and liquidity are reported ill Seclion 4. The relalioll, in a lime-series framework, belween spreads, volume and Irallsaclions is presented in Seclion 5, and a similar analysis relaled lO volalility is contained ill Seclion 6. Our mullivariale empirical evidence aboul lhe effects of dividend announcemel1ls on lhe implicil bid-ask spread is reponed in Seclioll 7. Finally, we summarise our resulls alld provide some conclusions ill Seclion 8.
Dala
The dala employed in lhis paper are oblained from two dala sources. Thc first sel consiSls of daily closing lrallsaclion prices for 100 compallies lraded 011 lhe cOlllillUOUS Spanish markel from 19 April 1990 lO 18 Oclober 1994.' Conlinuously compoullded daily relurns adjusled for dividends and change of capilal slrUClure are calculaled for each slock ill lhe sample. The relurns 011 all slocks available during each day are used lO compule an estimale of lhe daily relurn on lhe equally weighled markel porrfolio. Al lhc same lime, lhis dala sel conlaills the lolal numbcr of shares lri.ded in each slock durillg cach day of the amplillg periodo Fillally, we have lhe number of shares oUlslandillg for each slock al lhe end of each year from 1989 lO 1993.
The second dala sel consisls of lhe average of the five besl daily prices available ror bOlh purchases (lhe ask) and sales (lhe bid) for 70 sloeks from 2 January 1991 lO 18 OCLOber 1994 5 As we have already poinled oul, under lhe adverse seleclion argument, if lhe probability lhar some traders have insider informalion has increased, liquidilY providers may reacl by either increasing lhe bid-ask spread or by diminishing lhe number of shares available al each side of lhe markel (deplh). Forlunalely, our dala conlain the number of shares available al each price, again as Ihe average of the five besl sellillg and buying positiollS ill lhe markel. Finally. lhis dala sel inelude lhe number of lrallsaclions for each of lhe 70 slocks during each day of lhe sampling periodo Several fillers are run on lhe dala in order lO eliminate polenlial dala errors. (Ask + Bid)/2 3. Deplh = Deplh al Ask + Deplh al Bid.
Number of shares lraded per day
Number of shares oUlslanding al lhe end of lhe previous year
The 70 sloeks wilh eomplele liquidily and relurn dala are ranked aeeording lO lheir markel value al lhe end of lhe year preeeding lhe daily return ealeulalion. This ranking is mainlained lhroughoul eaeh year from 1991 lO 1994, and five equally weighled ponfolios wilh approximately lhe same number of sloeks are oblained. Porlfolio one eonlains lhe smallest firms and porlfolio five lhe larges!.
In lhe Spanish markel, priorily for erossing a lransaelion is delermined by priee. If priees turn oul lO be equal, lhen priorily is given 10 lhe arrival lime of lhe order. Moreover, during lhe sample period of lhe sludy, lhe 101 markel is lhe mosl represenlalive way of lrading in lhe Spanish eonlinuous auelion syslem. LoIS are indivisible seIs of 25,50 or 100 shares depending on whelher lhe c10sing priee of lhe seeurily during lhe previous session is aboye 5,000 pese las, belween 1,001 and 5,000 peselas, or below 1.001 peselas. The minimum priee varialion is 10, 5 or 1 pesela for 10lS of 25, 50 or 100 shares. The maximum priee varialion is 5% for lhe opening price, and an addilional 10% for lhe regular session.
For lhe lesls reponed in Seelions 4 and 7, lhe dale and magnilude of all announeemenls of dividend paymenls made by any of lhe 70 sloeks are idenlified by searehing lhe Officia! Journa! of rile Madrid Stock Excllllnge for lhe period from 2 January 1991 10 18 Oelober 1994. The following seleclion crileria are employed for lhe inclusion of a dividend announeemenl in our sample: 1. We reslriel our sample 10 regular cash dividends payable in peselas. Any final, inilialion, omission, special or non-recurring dividends are excluded from lhe sample. 2. If a dislribulion lO sloekholders different from eash is made during lhe period from 10 lrading days before lO 10 lrading days alter lhe announcement of a regular eash dividend, we drop lhe announcemenl from lhe sample. The idea, of eourse, is lO eliminale any eonfounding impael of lock splilS or any kind of non-eash dislribulion. 3. Under lhe same line of reasoning, if any ehange of capilal Slruclure is announced from 10 lrading days before lo 10 lrading days afler lhe announeemenl of a dividend paymenl, we exclude lhe announcement from our sample. 4. 1n order lo be incorporaled inlo our sample, al leasl 3 lrading days musl elapse belween lhe announeement dale and lhe ex-dividend dale. There are 157 dividend announeemenls lhal salisfied lhe aboye erileria. Moreover, our sample is divided inlo lhree groups depending on whelher lhe dividends are higher than, equal 10. or In this seetion, we examine lhe general eharaeterislies of lhe Spanish markel regarding alternalive measures of liquidily. Given lhe well-known evidenee that suggesls importanl eross-seelional and time-series differenees among size-sorted portfolios, we ealculate lhe average of our measures of liquidily aeross firms wilhin a size-sorted portfolio.
Deseriptive slalislics for our five porlfolios are eontained in Table 1 . This table reporls lhe average eslimales of relalive bid-ask spreads. average deplh, average turnover, average volume (lotal daily number of shares lraded), number of lransaelions, daily portfolio relurns, and average eSlimat.es of markel value (in millions of pesetas).
11 is clear lhal lhe numbers in Table 1 refleel t.he lrong diversily of firms employed in this analysis. 1l is surprising lhal lhe usual size effeel reported in previous sludies seems to disappear afler 1991 even before risk is adjusted for' The average markeL values range from 4,973 million peselas for lhe smallesl firms lo 541,684 million peselas for lhe largesl sloeks. The average daily relurn is negalive for lhe firsl group of firms, and beeomes posilive for large firms. Moreover, Lhere exisls a slrong eross-seelional varialion in trading frequency. The average number of lransaetions varies from 53 for Ihe smallesl firms lO 252 for lhe largesl sloeks. Similar evidenee is found in lerms of volume. Jt is inleresling, however, Lhal lhe number of shares of small firms traded in lhe markel is higher lhan the number of shares lraded in portfolios 2 and 3. In lhe same line. lurnover is clearly larger for small firms.' Finally, diversity of firms is also found in lhe average of relalive spread and deplh. 1l should be noled lhal a large deplh indieales thal lhere is a higher probability of exeeuling an order againsl a .landing bid or offer. Henee, we would expeel a negalive eonelation belween spreads and depths. Lee el al. (1993) are the first aulhors to perform formal lesls on lhe relalion beLween spreads and depths. For a sample of ew York Sloek Exehange firms. lhey show how wide spreads lend lO be associaled wilh low deplhs' In our sample, we find a negative correlation belween bolh measures of liquidily aeross all firms of 0.27. 11 is surprising, however, lhat small firms presenl grealer deplh lhan middle-size stoeks. In any case, we can infer thal on average large companies are more liquid lhan small eompanies. On lhe olher hand, lhe percentage spread is ignificantly higher on Monday lhan in any of lhe olher days of lhe week. A reversed patlern is found for deplh.
[1 seems Ihal Monday presents a signifieantly lower liquidily Ihan during lhe rest of lhe week. Moreover, lurnover, volume and Iransaclions are significal1lly lower On Mondays Ihan for the resl of lhe week. II should also be noled Ihal volalility seems lO be higher on Mondays. Finally, relative spreads, lurnover, lransaclions, average relurns and volaliJity are higher in January than in the resl of the year. However. depth is nol significanlly different in January lhan in lhe resl of lhe year. II is diffieull lO reconcile lhe larger relative spread of January with olher intuitive measures of liquidily and lrading.
Four lhree-dimensional graphs eonlain further evidenee relaled lO seasonality and Jiquidity across our five portfolios. Figure I presenls lhe average relalive bid-ask spread for stoeks in our five size-sorted portfolios over the days of lhe week. As we alreacly know, the relative spread is a monolonie funelion of firm size with lhe spread largesl for themalleslslocks.llis inlere ling Ihal this paltern holds over all days of lhe week. Al lhe same lime, we can appreciale lhal the pereentage spread is also a monolonic funclion of days of lhe week; lhe largesl spread occurs on Mondays, independenlly of the size-sorted portfolio. Figure 2 i a similar Ihree-dimen ional graph, where we inelude deplh ralher lhan relalive spread. 11 is more diffieult to observe a e1ear patlern aeross days of lhe week. Deplh, howe er, seems to be lower for larger eompanies on Mondays. Al Ihe same lime, we observe lhe J-patlern aeross our five size-orled porlfoJios for every day of Ihe week. Figures 3 and 4 eonlain a similar Iype of evidenee regarding January and Ihe resl of lhe year. The monotonie funelion of firm size wilh lhe relative spread is preservecl for January and for lhe rest of lhe year. Moreover, independenlly of lhe portfolio observed, lhe relalive spread is always higher in January. Figure 4 maintains the J-pattern for deplh aeross portfolios, and shows a very similar deplh aeross all monlhs of lhe year.
Intriguing patterns of alternalive measures of liquidity and trading have been found in the Spanish conlinuous auetion market. Researeh direeted loward lhe explanalion of lhese patlerns is e1early justified and is lefl for fulure papers.
We are now in a position to investigale potential ehanges in the eompensalion of adverse seleelion and markel liquidily arouncl dividend announeements.
Dividend announcements and market liquidity: univariale empirical evidence
II is well known that dividend signalling theories suggcsI that dividends eonvey information aboul managers' expeelations regarding the future prospects of the firm.'" Several papers have reponed signifieant price reactions 10 dividend changcs." Therefore. it eems reasonable lhat if the bid-ask spread incorporates an adverse informalion component, we would expect 10 find changes in spread during pcriods of dividend announcements. Hence, dividend announcements are a panicularly wcll suited strategy for analysing the effecl of changes in information asymmetry. Unfortunately, previous studies have mostly concentrated on earnings announcements, and they have been carried out in the continuous dealer market case. In fact, 10 the best of our knowledge, this is lhe first study of changes in information asymmelry within the context of a eonlinuous auction Illarket. Moreover, the work of Morse and Ushman (1983) , Venkatesh and Chiang (1986) , Skinner (1991) , Barelay and Dunbar (1991) , and Daley el al. (1991) tends to find comradietory evidence thal is very difficult lO interpret. The most complete and careful analysis regarding the effeet of earnings announcement on market liquidity is that published by Lee el al. (J993). They convincingly argue that spreads widen and depths fall whenever market participam amicipate earnings announcemenls. They also show that Lhese effeels are more pronounced for announcelllents with the larger subsequent price move. They coneJude thal during the days prior to earnings announcelllents and during the evenl interval there exisls an unambiguous decrease in liquidity.
The reasoning by which they explain their results may be extrapolatecl to dividend announcements. It may be argued that the timing throllghout the year of both earnings and dividends announcements is largely predictable. Thus, in a continuous auction mechanism, if liquidity providers anticipate a greater probability of trading against informed investors in advance of dividend announcemenls, the adverse seleelion model would imply a wider bid-ask spread. In terms of market liquidity, under similar eireumstances, it seems also reasonable to predict a smaller depth. Of eour e, if the timing of dividend announeemenls is nol predielable, and lhere are no leakages prior to lhe arrival of new infonnalion, we should nol expeel lO find any impael on spread.
Allhough, given lhe eharaelerislics of dividend paymenls, il may be reasonable lO expeel an inerease in informal ion asymmelry before dividend announeemenls, lhe predielions for lhe announeemenl and even for lhe beginning of lhe pOSlannouneement periods may depend upon how noisy lhe signal lransmilled lO Ihe market ¡s. Ir a dividend announccmcnt may be rcgarded as a non-noisy signal, given lhal managers are beller informed lhan oUlsiders, lhe informalion eOnlel1l of dividends reduces informalion asymmelries among lraders, and eonsequenlly, we should expeel a lower bid-ask spread.
On lhe olher hand, if dividend announeemenls may be inlerpreled as noisy signals (as earnings are), il should be laken il1lo aeeounl lhal insiders are more able lO undersland lhe news eonveyed by Ihe announeement. This is lhe poinl raised by Kim and Verreeehia (1994) regarding earnings announcements. Independenlly of lrading volume. lhese atllhors argue lhal noisy signals slimulale informed jtldgements. If lhis is lhe case, we may expeel higher informalion asymmelry after lhe announcemel1ls, and eonsequenlly, a wider bid-ask spread should be found.
In order lO invesligale lhe impacl of dividend announcemenls on markel liquidily for eaeh of lhe four charaelerislics employed in lhe analysis (spread, defined as lhe differenee belween lhe ask priee and lhe bid priee, deplh, volume and number of transactions). we divide every observation in lhe sample period by the average of its corre ponding day of lhe week. In olher words. if the particular observation lurns oul lO be for Monday. then this observalion is divided by lhe average of Ihe analysed charaClerislic for Mondays. The same procedure is followed for lhe resl of lhe week. This hould lake inlo accoul1l lhe slrong sea onality found in our alternalive measures of liquidily. Moreover. all variables are expressed as percel1lage devialions from lhe daily seasonal adjusled mean value of lhe characlerislic being slUdied. It i imporlanl lO realise thal lhis procedure is repealed for each individual firrn with a dividcnd announcclllent during lhe salllpling periodo [n particular, we calculate lhe following slatislics for a11 firms in lhe sample:
where K, is lhe characlerislic being analysed (spread, deplh, volullle or IransaClions), S, is Ihe aClual liquidily slalislic during day 1 (spread in day 1, deplh in day r, elc.), and SI'l is lhe average of lhe liquidily slalislic for Ihe corresponding day of the week. The empirieal rcsulls arc conlained in Table 3 . The evidence seems slrikingly consistent wilh changes in informalion asymmelry during lhe day immcdiately before Ihe evelll, and during lhe day of Ihe announeemcnl. The spread decreases by 12.4% during event time, and the reduclion is significanlly different from zero. It seems lhat dividends convey precise informalion aboul Ihe firm. so lhal Ihe adverse seleclion component of pread is c1early redueed. Therefore, informal ion asymmelry risks tend lO disappear whenever Ihere is a dividend announcemenl. 11 should be nOled thal lhe official annOllncemenl of all dividend payments employed in the anicle is made al some point during evenl day zero.
The second colllmn of Tablc 3 rcports similar slatisties for deplh. Interestingly, lhe rcslllis are not signifieanlly different from zero. There is sorne evidenee, however. Ihal pereenlage changes in deplh tend lO be posilive. In any case, dividend announcemellls do nol seem 10 imply unambigllous changes in markel liqllidily.
The lasl two eolumns in this illlportalll poinl and, as we will see later :n lhe paper. il will have serious eonsequenees for lhe inlerprelation of lhe resulls. Figure 5 shows lhe eumulalive pereenlage ehanges around evenl lime for lhe four eharaelerislies employed in lhe analysis. 11 can be observed lhal spread lends lO deerease around lhe announeemenls. whilsl volume and lransaelions move in lhe oppo ile direelion. There can also be appreeialed a small jump in deplh during lhe days immedialely before lhe event. BOlh Table 3 and Fig. 5 suggesl lhal ehanges in spread around lhe announeements may lend lO disappear if we check for lhe silllullaneous effeel on eilher volume or lransaelions. We will come baek lO lhis imponant is ue in Seelion 7. The results in Table 4 are partitioned according to whelher the dividend is increased, maintained, or decrcascd relative lo lhe previous payment ovcr lhe (approximatcly) same lime of thc ycar befo re lhc announcemenl. As befare, lhe evidence is consislent wilh ehange in informalion asymmelry risks, In lerms of spread, Ihe major impacl OCCllrS for maintained and decreased dividends. There are significant reduclions in Ihe sprcad of bOlh groups of stocks during lhe day before the event, and on lhe day of Ihe dividend announcemenl. The spread for companies announcing less dividends diminishes by almosl 24%. It seems Ihal a signal corroboraling negalive proposals for Ihe companies eliminates polenlial informal ion asymmelries. This would be rellecled in Ihe significant reduclion of spread. On lhe othcr hand, lhe enormous increase in volume and Iransaclions around decreased dividend announcemenls should be poinled oul. Once again. lhe resulls rcgarding ehangcs in spread may simply rellecl lhe confounding effeels of eilher volume or lransaclions.
Finally, perecnlage ehanges in deplh are nol signirieantly dilTerent from zero during event lime. However. in the case of inereased dividends, lhere seem 10 be significant reduetions in deplh during the days immedialely afler the evenl. Intereslingly. Ihe reverse pallern is found for deereased dividend announcemenls.
In general. our results mighl be inlerpreled in favour of liquidilY providers being sensilive lO changes in informalion asymmelry risk. Unfortunalely, however. il may be lhe case lha! spread and eilher volume or lransaclions are negalively relaled. This m~IY aller lhe interprelalion of lhe resullS. The spccifie relalion bCl\Vccn sprcads, volumc, and transactions is investigated nexl.
Tite reJation between sprcads, volume and transactions
Unlikc lhe extcllsivc exisling cross-secliona\ evidence bctwcen spreads, volume and lhe 11L1l11ber 01' transactions,l.' evidence rclatcd lO lhe time-series rclalion bCI\Vccn these variables is vcry limited. In fae!, wilhin a continuous dealer markel, the firsl paper dealing c1ircclly wilh lhis issuc was recenlly published by Lee el al. (1993) . 1I sbould be nOled, however, Ihal Iheir evidence is exclusively direcled loward Ihe lemporal rclalion belween spread (and deplh) and volume. 
where SP, is lhe actual spread during day r, and SP", is the average spread for the corresponeling day 01' lhe week over lhe whole periodo The normaliseel volume (NV) and normaliseellransaclions (NN) are given by:
JVOL, rN:
NV, =
VOL(»; NN, = -Jw
here VOL, is lhe number 01' shares lraded in each slock during e1ay 1, N, represenls lhe number 01' lransaclions 01' each slOck during day r, and VOL I " anel Ñ 1 ,) are, as befo re and respectively, lhe average of volume and lransaclions for their corresponding day of lhe week. II should bc poinlcd oul lhal lhe distribulions of the explanatory variables are highly skewed. Thus, lhe square rools of the variables are employed so thal outliers do not dominate the empirical evidence. Moreovcr, given lhal the re iduals from OLS regressions are 010 tly significantly autocorrelated, the regrcssiolls are repeated with an autoregressive lerm, and using lhe well known procedure suggested by Cochrane-Orcutl. BOlh lypes of adjustments produce identical qualitative results. Table 5 reports the results. The coefficienls conlained in tlle lable arc lhe cross-seclional average of all individual regressions. In parenlhesis, we reporl lhe I-statistics under the null hypothcsis lhat the cross-sectional mean of the cocfficient equals zero. While-consislent standard errors are used.
The results show a very strong negalive relation between volume and spreads.
In our time-series framework this suggesls Ihat, in the continuous auclion Spanish markel, spreads lend to be smaller during periods of higher volumc. This is exactly conlrary to the evidence reported by Lee el al. for lhe US markel. At the same time, it turns out lhal Ihere exists an even slrongcr negative relation between transaclions and spreads. This empirical evidence eems, therefore, consislent with the Harris and Raviv (1993) prediction lhal spreads and eilher (in their model) volume or transaclions are negalively associated.
The most striking rcsult of Table 5 is lhat the significant negalive relation between volume and spreads tends lo be cancelled oul when we indude simullaneously volume and the number of transaclions in the regressions. The slrong negative relation between transaclions and spreads is maintained, bul the negative association between volume and spreads becomes statistically insignificanl. This is an important result, and il to a cenain extcnl juslifies microstruclure theorelical model in which all trades are normalised to be of unit size. II may be argued that we should have employed the average lrade size ralher than the 10lal number of-shares as an explanatory variable. This would be the most natural decomposition of Ihe effects of volume on spreads. Of course, volume is the average trade size limes lhe number of transaclions. However, it was decided to keep volume so that we are able lo provide a direct comparison with lhe resulls obtained by Lee el al. Morcover. we may havc a multicollincarity problcm in the regressions given by equation (3). The range of the correlation coefficiel1ls bClween the normalised volume and the normalised number of transactions for each firm in Ihe sample goes from DAD to 0.90. II muSl be pointed OUI thal, in all cases, independently of the correlation coefficicnl. the effecl of volume disappears when the number of transaclions is taken in lO accounl.
We may condude Ihat spreads lend to decrease during periods of higher number of transaclions. In the conlexl of the Harris and Raviv (1993) model, we may argue that lhe increased number of transaclions primarily denoles an increase in liquidity Irading through public limil orders. In facl. when we regress lhe percenlage change of depth on Ihe normalised number of lransactions, it is found thal there is a positive, significant relation between depth and lransactions. This dearly suggests thal market liquidity lends to increase Wilh the number of transactions."
This result naturally leads towards further invesligalion of lhe number of transaclions as a key aspecl of lhe process of stock price adjustmenls. This is lhe next issue looked at in Ihis papel.
The relalion belween volalilily, volume and lransaclions
One way in which we may juslify lhe imponance of lhe number of lransacljons wilhin an cmpirical contexl of assel pricing is by analysing Ihe relalion belween lransaclions and volalilily.
80lh Ihe lheorelical models and empirical work relaled lO informalion effecls on assel pricing have generally accepled lhc popular view Ihal 'jI lake volumc lo move priccs'. In panicular, microslruclUre theory under asymmctrjc informalion suggests lhal informcd traders send small-sized Irades in order lO avoid losing Iheir comparalive advantage.'· This view assumes lhal the information Table 5 Thc rchuion bctwccn volul11c. numbcr of Iransaclions and sprcad.
For e;Jch stock in lhe samplc. a limc·serics rcgrcssion is nm wilh sprcad as Ihe dependen! vilriilble and vollJlne, lile ll11mbcr of Iransaclions or bOLh as Ibe indcpcndclll vari,thles. In panicular. for cach stock lhe following rcgrcssion w¡lh duily data from January 1991 10 OClOber 1994 is performcd:
whefe ¡he sprcad variable is givcn hy:
whcrc SP, i~Ihe actual spread during day 1, and Si'vl is lhe average of lhe sprcad for lhe curresponding day of lhe weck. Thc normaliscd volumc (NV) and nnrmalised transactions (NN) are given hy:
The reponed cocfficiclIts are (he cross-scctiollal average across al! stock.-; in Ihe sClmplc. In parcn 4 thescs \Ve reporl (he I-Sl<llislics undcr lhe null hYPOlhcsis that Ihe cross-scctional mean of (he cocfficicnls i~zeft).
Panel A: Rcgrcssiol1s with no corrcclion for serial i.IulOcorrclalions in lhe residlmls /l, (1994) show that on average the size of trades has virtually no incremenlal information con!en! once lhe number of transaclion is taken in!o account. In olher words, the well accepled positive relation between volume and volatility becomes in ignificantly different from zero when volatililY is conditioned on lhe number of transactions.
This finding may explain lhe strong relation lhal we found belween spreads and lhe number of trllnSaclions wilhin a lime-series framework. The information content in lrading behaviour is captured lhrough the number of lransactions lhal take place during a particular interval of lime.
Given lhe importan! differences in lhe lrading mechanism belween a eonlinuous dealer markel and our eontinuous auction markel. it was decided to analyse the relation belween volatility and the number of transaction .
In order ta estimale the conditional standard deviations of daily returns, the procedure suggested by Schwert (1990) , and employed by Jones el al. (1994) , is followed. lt is an extremely ea y way to estimate condilional volatilities and, at the same time, the procedure allows for stylised facts concerning stock return volatility.
We first cslimale lhe unexpected relurn on day I for all stocks in the sample wilh conlinuous data from 2 January 1991 to 18 Octaber 1994. Thus, a total of 60 securilies are available for the exercise. The unexpected retums of lhese slocks are given by the residuals of the following regression model:
Given thal lhe expeclation of lhe absolute value of a normal random variable equals (2/,,)!r-limes it standard devialion, the absolute residuals of equation (5) are multiplied by (2/,,)-10 to get lhe volalility of unexpected relurns. l ' In lhe regression aboye, five day-of-the-week dummies are included lO capture differences in mean returns. Moreover, tock relurns are regressed on 12 lagged returns lO estimate short-term movements in eonditional expected returns.
The e estimates of conditional volatility are regres ed on lhe number of transaClions and the average lrade size (tolal number of shares divided by the number of lransaction ) to delermine the relative imporlance of bolh variables. This exercise is performed by dividing lhe total number of slocks in!o five size-sorted portfolios, where ranking is obtained according to lhe market value of all 60 securilies al lhe end of 1992. This dale corresponds lo lhe midpoinl 01' our sampling periodo In particular, for individual slocks within each of lhe five sizesorted portfolios. we run seemingly unrelated regressions of our estimates of daily conditional volatility of returns on a lrading-gap dummy variable. average trade ize, number of lransactions. and 12 lagged absolute residuals from equation (5) to correct any persislence of volalilily:l' l' lío" I =~, +IJ, , , , DM, +II, , 'A v"+fJ, , , ft, + ¿ p" It" , 1 +w" (6) poi where D", equals 1 for Mondays and O otherwise, A V" is lhe average trade size 01' stock i wilhin a pOrlfolio p. N" represenls the nllmber 01' transaclions al' stock i in portfolio p, and jJ" measllres lhe persislence 01' volalilily in slOck i.
Tbe results are conlained in Table 6 . It seems thal volatilily is primarily determined by the number 01' transaclions. In all porlfolios, lhere exisls a strong posilive relation between lransactions and volatility. The information conlenl 01' lrading behaviollr is basically conlained in lhe nllmber of transaclions during lhe day. It is also the case lhal lhere is a positive relalion belween volatility and average lrade size for the smallesl firms. However, it seems evident thal the economic significanee of lhis relalion is negligiblc relalive lO the imporlance of the nllmber 01' transaclions. It shollld al O be nOled lhal lhe relalion belween average lrade size and volalility beeomes negative for large firms. Neverlheless, the economie relevance 01' lhis relalion seems 10 be ralher smal!. Al lhe same time, lhere is (almosl) a deereasing monolOnie relalion between lhe relalive impacl 01' lransactions on volatility anel firm size wilh lhe effeel largesl for lhe smallesl firms. This sllggesls lhat the information eontent 01' lrading ineorporaled inlo lhe number al' transaclions is parlicularly relevant for small firms.
It may be lhe case lhal lhe relalively liule information aboul small firms may be lhe reason behind these reslllts. Finally, il is inleresting lo poinl oul the decreasing monOlonic relation belween the nMgnilllde al' lhe coefficiems associated lo lhe Monday dummy variable and firm size. Given an empirical evidence found in Seclions 5 and 6, it becomes necessary to study whether lhe apparent reduclion in information asymmelry risks of Tables  3 and 4 documents eithcr a changing compensation of adverse seleclion during dividends announcements or simply reflects lhe general relalion belween spreads alld lransactions.
This issue is particularly relevant for the literalure dealing with lhe sensitivity of liquidity providers to the arrival of new informalion which may aller asymmetries of information among agents. It should be noted that the paper by Lee el al. (1993) conlrols for volume when analysing the impact of earnings announcements on markel liquidity. However, lhey ignore thc potential effects of the number of lransaclions, which may be reaJly behind lheir significanl results. Our plan for lhis seclion is lO sludy the impact of dividend announeements on spread conlroJling for bOlh volume and transactions in two separate multiple regression tesis. This would aJlow us lO reach precise conclusions about changing compensalion of adverse selection.
In order 10 carry out these tests, a lime-series regrcssion is ron for each stock in lhe sample lhat had at least one dividend announccment with the percentage seasonaJly adjusted spread as the dependent variable, and event period dummy variables, and eilher volume or transaclions as the independent variables. In particular the foJlowing regression with daily dala from 2 January 1991 lO 18 October 1994 is performed for each stock: (7) r--4 where. as in equation (3), the spread variable is given by:
and lhe conlrol variable, ev" is eilhcr the normalised volume or thc normalised transaclions of equation (3):
NN,-
To capture spread shifts around dividend announeements a dummy variable, D,,, is included which equals I if observalion I is event day r and O olherwise.
The coefficients associated wilh these indicator variables represent changes in lhe mean of thc spread during the event period, after controJling for lhe polenlial effeels of eilher volume or lransaelions. Finally, Ihe error lerm of equalion (7) is a sumed 10 be, 1), = ti, +;' 11, " where ;' is Ihe AR( 1) paramelers. and ti, is an independent and identieally distribuled normal variable with mean zero and constant variance.
The results are eontained in Table 7 . The reported coeffieients are lhe crossseelional average of Ihe eSlimaled coefficients oblained wilh Ihe individual regressions given by Ihe expression (7) . As before. in parel1lheses we presenl Ihe l-stalislics under lhe null hypolhesis thal lhe eross-seelional mean of lhe coeffieienls equals zero. White consislenl slandard errors are used. This table shows lhe results ror lhe eomplele sample of 157 dividends announeemenls.
The eonclusions lhal may be drawn from Tablc 7 are clear. Conlrolling for lhe number of Iransaelions does affeel lhe resulls about lhe impaet of dividends announeemenls on the spread a day before Ihe announeement, as well as during Ihe announcement period.'" The signifieant 12'Y reduclion in spread that we reported in Table 3 for the day of lhe announcement decreases lO an insignificant 4% once we control for Ihe number of Iransaclions. It is interesting lO nole lhal lhe deerease also beeomes insignificant when we control for volume. In lhis case, however, lhe magnilude or lhe reduelion remains around 6% (wilh a 1-slalislie of 1.57). Very similar resulls are round ror Ihe day before lhe announeemen!. In general, eonlrolling for lhe number or lransaelions has larger effeels on the mean shirls of lhe spread over Ihe whole evenl window lhan eontrolling ror volume. This is of course Ihe result we expeeted. given lhe evidenee eOl1lained in Tables 5 and 6 .
There is anolher sense in whieh eontrolling for the number of Iransaclions in lhis lype of slUdy may be lhe appropriale way 10 perform lhe analysis. Moreover, lhis may be a particularly relevant issue for conlinuous auction markels. In a reccnl working paper, Kumar and Seppi (1993) show Ihat when limil orders and markel orders are allowed lO eo-exisl, the slruelure of lhe limil book may presenl a widening spread belween Ihe best buy and . ell orders exclusively due lO élnticipatcd increases in stock rcturn volatility arollnd dividcnd anl10UIlCe-mel1ls. The poinl which lhey emphasise is lhal lhis may even be the case withoul adverse seleelion. In our case, lhe impacl is nol significant so lhal Ihe polenlial dislurhing effeels of anlieipaled volmilily does nol seem lO be relevan!. In general. however. lhe resulls of Tahle 6 suggesl lhal eonlrolling ror lhe number of lransaelions would tend 10 avoid eonfounding effeelS between adverse seleclion and antieipaled volalilily. This implies Ihat by including lhe numher of lransaclions in our regressions we may be in fael eliminating Ihese crfeels."
The empirieal evidenee in Table 7 complelely reverses Ihc parlial eonclusions we drew from Tahle 3. Liquidily providers do nol seem to be sensilive to changing informalion risks around dividend announeemenls. Henee, lhe bid-ask spread does nol seem lo contain any eompensalion ror adverse seleclion. In lhe eontinuous Spanish Slock Exehange auelion lrading mechanism. we do nol find any evidence after conlrolling for lhe Ilumbcr of LransacLions thal informatioll asymmelry deereases during dividend announcements. 1I may be argued, or eourse. Ihat an allernalive bul coherenl explanalion of our results may simply be that dividend announcements are n01 an adcquate proxy for information asyrnmelries among market participants. It may be also possible lhm bOlh spread and Iransaetions (or volume) and volume goes lOo far. This is a very conlroversial issue. UnfOrlunalely, we do nol know lhe proper way of dealing wilh lhis pOlenlial problem. Panels A and B of Table 8 conlain similar empirical evidence. In lhese lwO panels, lhe results are parlilioned by lhe increased, mainlained, or c1ecrcased dividends relalive lO lhe previous paymcnt al (approximalely) lhe same lime lhe year before lhe announcemenl. For Ihe firsl lwO groups we do nol find any significant ehange in lhe bid-ask spread during lhe evenl window from day -4 lO day +4. It should be recallecl lhal before we conlrolled for lhe number of lransaclions lhc reduclion of sprcacl on lhc c1ay before lhc announcemenl, as well as during lhe evcnl day, was larger for eompanies announcing a decrease in their dividend payments. In olher words, a negative signal seemed lO convey a very slrong reduclion in informalion asymmelry risks. This was a ralher surprising resull. In fael, we may now conciude Ihat lhe negalive relalion belween Ihe number of lransaclions and spreads explains lhe significanl change in informalion asymmelry risks found in Table 3 . We observe from Panel A of Table 8 lhal lhe former reduclions of spread even become posilive afler we conlrol for lhe number of transaclions. 11 shoulcl be recognised lhal our lhree groups of dividend changes exhibit some evidence of differenlial effecls during the day before Ihe announcemenl. Increasecl dividencl firms have a .10% reduelion in spreacl (t-slatislics of 1.22), mainlained dividend slOcks more lhan 4% fall in spread, whilsl deereased dividend companies presenl a positive ehange of 15% (t-Slalislics of 1.23). In any case, neilher of lhese pereenlage changes is significantly differenl from zero.
Panel B of Table 8 shows lhal Ihe same resull holds lrue when we conlrol for lhe number of shares Iraded.
In general, we may suggesl lhal lhe arrival of negalive news aboul lhe fulure prospecls of a firm does nol sccm lO incorporale changes in informalion asymmelry risk beyoncl whal is normally eonveyed Ihrough increased number of lransaclions. 11 should be poinled OUI, however, lhal lhere is an exeeplion. The impacl on spread remains negalive and significant four days before Ihe announCemenl. even after we conlrol for lhe number of lransaclions. Ir lraders anlicipate lhe announcemenl dale for pOlenlially dislres ed companies, Ihere may be an increase in lheir liquidily Ihal may bc renecled somehow in lhe reduclion of spread. It should be poinled OUI lhal lhis group of announcemenls exhibilS high and posilive percenlage changes in lhe number of lransaclions from day -4 lO day + 2. This suggests lhal informalion arrives lO lhe markel four days before lhe announcemenl. We also find some negalive percentage changes in Ihe spread of Ihese companies during lhe days befo re and up lO Ihe evenl window employecl in Table 8 . As before, il may be an indicalion lhal lhe liming IhroughoUI Ihe year of dividcnd announcemenls is prcdiclable. Howcvcr, negalive percentagc changes Call11ot be attributed to advcrsc selectioll. During these prc-announcemenl days, sprcad should become wider if adverse seleelion is behind Ihe observed changes of spread.
Finally, if relalively lillle informalion about small firms reaches lhe markel during periocls olber lhan c1iviclencl announcements, we might expecl dividend 
